Abstract It is usually assumed that stock prices reflect a balance between large numbers of small individual sellers and buyers. However, over the past fifty years mutual funds and other institutional shareholders have assumed an ever increasing part of stock transactions: their assets, as a percentage of GDP, have been multiplied by more than one hundred. The paper presents evidence which shows that reactions to major shocks are often dominated by a small number of institutional players. Most often the market gets a wrong perception and inadequate understanding of such events because the relevant information (e.g. the fact that one mutual fund has sold several million shares) only becomes available weeks or months after the event, through reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Our observations suggest that there is a radical difference between small (< 0.5%) day-to-day price variations which may be due to the interplay of many agents and large (> 5%) price changes which, on the contrary, may be caused by massive sales (or purchases) by a few players. This suggests that the mechanisms which account for large returns are markedly different from those ruling small returns.
Introduction
Very broadly speaking, there are two ways to represent stock markets and also two different methodologies to choose between them (Fig. 1) . In the micro-player representation, the number of players is large enough to be treated by using statistical methods. In this case, each individual player has only a negligible impact on daily price changes. On the contrary, in the macro-player representation, the number of players is small and each one has a substantial impact not only on daily price changes but even on weekly or monthly price changes. In the second case a game theoretic approach would be more sensible than a statistical approach. The main objective of this paper is to find out which of these descriptions corresponds to the situation of markets in 2004. A first hint is provided by the sheer weight of the macro-players. In 1900, the share of financial institutions in total corporate stock outstanding was 6.7%, in 1974 it was 33%, in 2002 it was of the order of 50% (Kotz 1978 
Fig.1
In this paper we want to discriminate between the micro-and macro-player representations by observing the reactions of stocks to major shocks. Trying to unravel market mechanisms prior to any attempt at constructing specific mathematical models can be labeled as ex-ante analysis, as opposed to ex-post analysis which in econometrics is the standard approach.
The purpose of this paper is to show that many (though not all) important phenomena that occur nowadays in stock markets belong to the second class. In order to make this point, we will use an approach which can be labelled as an ex-ante analysis. In what sense does it differ from the more commonly used ex-post analysis? In the ex-post analysis, one begins by building a mathematical model whose predictions are then compared to a number of stylized facts. In econometrics, this is the approach which is used almost exclusively. In the ex-ante analysis one tries to design an "experiment" whose results give us a better insight into the mechanisms which are at work. When using the term "experiment" I do not mean a laboratory experiment with paid human subjects but rather a problem-oriented observation (also referred to as a quasi-experiment) selected and designed in order to shed new light on a specific phenomenon. In this paper I will use the ex-ante analysis in order to decide which of the micro-or macro-representation is more acceptable. More specifically, I
will emphasize the importance of strategic investments as opposed to transactions based on expected value. In addition, by monitoring as closely as possible the behavior of shareholders in the weeks and days preceding a bankruptcy, I will analyze how investors react to the risk of bankruptcy. Although the paper relies on a number of case studies, I believe that the behaviors which will be identified have a fairly broad validity. To begin with, I consider the case of Kmart, the American retail store company.
Kmart: background information
As several of the cases to be considered below concern Kmart, it is in order to give some background information for this company. It was founded in 1899 by Sebastian Kresge and was called the Kresge company until 1977 when its name was changed to Kmart. As shown by Fig. 2a In 1993, Kmart had to close 5% of its stores and in 1994 it experienced a loss of one billion dollars.
These poor performances led to increased indebtedness and in 1996, the rating of its debt was lowered below investment grade. For a company of the size of Kmart to be rated at junk level is something which is not common. In subsequent years, Kmart continued to lose market shares to Wal-Mart.
The fall of its share price shown in Fig. 2a is consistent with this loss of momentum. However, the trajectory of the stock price shown in Fig. 2b ,c is fairly puzzling and raises the following questions:
• Why did it increase by almost 100% between September 2000 and August 2001?
• Why did it abruptly drop in January 2002 leading the company into bankruptcy? Naturally, Kmart denied that there was any link between the two transactions. However, one should keep in mind that in 1999 Kmart tried to initiate a buyback program of its own shares for a total amount of $ 1 billion; assuming a price range from $ 5 to $ 10 per share, this represented between 20% and 40% of its outstanding shares. Unable to complete this program by itself because of its indebtedness, Kmart certainly relied on the deal with Burkle for implementing its objective, albeit on a smaller scale than planned initially.
To sum up, the 100% price increase in Fig.2b had much to do with Burkle and Fleming, but very little with Kmart itself. We now turn to the events which occurred in the weeks before Kmart's bankruptcy.
The withdrawal of Fidelity from Kmart
In a fraction of their initial price. Of course, on the NYSE it is the duty of market makers to ensure market fluidity, but it is difficult to understand how can they fulfill this task when there are no buyers whatsoever.
Before we turn to the next episode we need to better understand what happens once a corporation has filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, especially with respect to its shares and shareholders.
Impact of bankruptcy on stocks
After the bankruptcy, some of the major debt holders usually provide short-term cash to the bankrupt company; in return, they get highest priority on the list of the creditors. On the contrary, common share holders are listed at the bottom. However, it should be noted that a company is not automatically delisted from the exchange after asking for bankruptcy protection. The only immediate change is the fact that the ticker symbol becomes followed by the letter Q. Thus Kmart's ticker symbol was changed from KM to KMQ. Incidentally, one week after the bankruptcy the price stood at $ 1.4, more than double the $ 0.66 the stock was worth the day the bankruptcy was declared; but this improvement did not last very long. On the New York Stock Exchange the criteria for continued listing include a requirement that a company's stock trade at a minimum average price of 1 dollar over a 30-day period.
In the case of Kmart, the share traded under the $ 1 threshold from July to December 2002 and, as a result, it was delisted from the NYSE in December. But even after that, the stock continued to be Does this mean that Kmart had solved its problems and was up for a new start? Certainly not. Kmart's market share continued to shrink and in fact at a faster rate than before the bankruptcy. In 2003, comparable-store sales dropped by 30% and, even more worrying, the rate accelerated from 3.2%
in the first quarter to 13% in the last quarter. Yet, over that time interval the share price more than doubled. How can one explain that?
The answer is very simple. There was a permanent flow of purchases by Lampert's hedge fund (see table 1 ). It should be noted that all these transactions were performed in the Non-Open market. In this market, the price is settled by a prior agreement between buyers and sellers. As all the shares were in the hands of various institutions, it is very likely that strategic considerations played a big role in these transactions. The financial situation of Kmart did indeed improve but only because it sold some of this stores to Sears, Roebuck and Co. and to Home Depot 3 .
Hints about the future of Kmart
As the price rise documented in Fig. 2d was largely disconnected from underlying fundamentals, it can hardly be expected that it will continue for long. In fact, it will continue until Lampert decides that his strategy no longer requires the price to rise. Several analysts expect that Lampert will continue to sell the most valuable assets of Kmart before eventually taking it completely out of the retail business.
Whether that can be done in the present framework or requires the liquidation of the company is a matter of debate. As one analyst lucidly commented, now that Kmart is under the control of ESL, Remark With over 80% of the shares in the hands of ESL Investments one would expect the trading volume for Kmart's shares to be markedly lower than for other corporations whose ownership is less concentrated. Yet, one observes exactly the opposite. Between July and September 2004, an average 2.7 million shares were traded daily which represents 3% of the shares outstanding; that figure is about 150 times higher than for General Electric and 11 times higher than for IBM. Why is Kmart trading volume one or two orders of magnitude higher than such widely traded stocks as GE or IBM?
This remains an open question.
Summary of Kmart's case
Let us summarize what we learned from this case-study.
1) Until 1999-2000 there was a connection between Kmart's share price and its achievements as a discount retailer.
2) After October 2000, there is a one-year episode marked by a strong price rise due to a deal with a supplier which bears no relationship whatsoever with Kmart's performances.
3) The bankruptcy occurred when one of the major share holders withdrew its support. Although it is difficult to distinguish with certainty between cause and consequence, the question must be examined in the light of what happened subsequently, namely the fact that the corporation fell under the control of Lampert's hedge fund.
4) The 700% price increase between May 2003 and September 2004 was completely at variance with the evolution of Kmart's growth fundamentals.
Kmart was selected because it went through a bankruptcy. The idea was that a major shock would reveal features about the behavior of share holders which are relatively obscured and hidden in more ordinary conditions. However, similar mechanisms are at work also in cases characterized by big shocks even in the absence of a bankruptcy. This is illustrated by the following example.
Converium
Converium ( has reduced its holding in Converium from 9.87% to 3.81%.
As is common in such announcements, it did not say when exactly Fidelity had sold its shares 6 . As in the case of Kmart in January 2002, a flow of bad news followed. For instance, on September 1, Standard and Poor's cut the rating of Converium's North America to BBB, just one notch above junk status. The rating of Converium AG, the Swiss unit was also lowered. In this respect, it should be noted that in principle the role of rating agencies is to foresee possible financial problems ahead of the "market", whereas in this case as well as in many others (e.g. Enron, Kmart, WorlCom) their reactions followed the announcement made by the company, in the present case by more than one month.
At first sight, one may be tempted to think that these reactions were simply the normal consequence of a change in the growth fundamentals of the company. However, the fact that on August 10, Capital Group, another mutual fund, increased its stake in Converium from 4.05% to 5.34% shows that the fundamentals were not read in the same way by all the players. In fact, it seems it was rather a showdown between two groups of players.
On September 15, 2004 came the first rumors that Converium could become the target of a possible takeover, an operation that its low stock price facilitated. The most widely named potential buyers were Munich Re and Berkshire Hathaway, Warren Buffet's company. On September 17, Converium made known that its discussions to enter into a possible partnership with these two companies were nearing a successful conclusion.
To what extent is it possible to generalize the results of these case-studies? One can give the following answers.
• The Kmart episode was not an isolated example. As a matter of fact, the strategy Lampert used at Kmart had been used previously in others of its acquisitions such as Autonation (NYSE:AN), America's largest retailer of new and used vehicles, Autozone (NYSE: AZO), Deluxe (NYSE: DLX) and finally Sears, Roebuck and Co (NYSE: S).
• The fact that an investment fund reduces its stake in a company to a considerable extent in a short time interval is relatively common. Table 2 gives a number of illustrations over 2002-2004 for FMR which naturally is only one of the giant mutual funds (albeit the largest). Usually the growth fundamentals of a company do not change sharply in a few months which means that such massive sales (or purchases) pursued broader strategic objectives. Washington (Feb. 18 2004 ), New York Times (June 11 1994 , January 12 1996 , Aug. 15 1996 Wall Street Journal (Oct. 12 1995) ; USA Today (May 9 1996); Boston Herald (July 11 1996).
Conclusion
The main message of this paper is the observation that many of the major shocks to which companies are confronted are due to the moves of a small number of investment funds. The key role played by major investment funds can be further illustrated by comparing the major holders of three airline companies, namely American Airlines, Delta Airlines, and US Airways. Table   3 summarizes the information as of September 10, 2004. 2) There is a fundamental difference between the major holders of American and Delta on the one hand and those of US Airways on the other. In the latter we do not find any major investment funds with a substantial (say over 1%) stake. Most of the shares are in the hands of the Alabama Retirement Fund which, through its links with Social Security, is probably partly funded by federal money. This striking difference is certainly to be attributed to the fact that US Airways went through bankruptcy in August 2002. As seen previously, stocks are likely to lose all their worth in a bankruptcy process.
For major holders the main problem therefore is to be able to sell before the price has collapsed.
Naturally, such tactics are double edged because the withdrawal of a major holder may drive down the market price to a point which makes bankruptcy ineluctable.
3) On financial websites such as Yahoo, investment companies are listed apart from the funds itself. One may wonder if such a distinction is really relevant. Consider for instance the Vanguard Group which offers more than 100 funds. It can be admitted that in ordinary day-to-day operations, each fund has some autonomy. However, in critical junctures (such as a bankruptcy risk) all funds tend to follow the same tactic as can be seen from the fact that all Vanguard funds left US Airways as it was stumbling toward its first bankruptcy 7 . Fig. 4 shows that, since 1945, mutual funds experienced an exponential growth which was shortly interrupted only by the bear market of 1968-1978. As for any exponential growth, the beginnings were inconspicuous. It is only in recent years that mutual funds were able to get a firm grip on American stock markets. If this evolution continues the conception based on micro-players will become less and less relevant.
In a previous paper (Roehner 2005) it was shown that, through buyback programs, corporations can influence the price level of their own stock. To make that point we did not have to resort to microeconomic analysis as we did in the present paper; why did the present study require behavior analysis at the level of individual players? The answer is obvious. We wanted to scrutinize the economic rationale of the moves of major players and in order to do that one has to understand and weigh their actions in detail. Such an approach is complimentary to the comprehensive macrodynamic analysis of market structure carried out by other researchers such as for instance Elroy Dimson et al. (2002) , Rosario Mantegna et al. (2000) or Didier Sornette (2003) . Finally, there is an important question which we did not consider and which should be addressed in a subsequent study. What is the kind of interaction between macro-players. Is it a competitive or cooperative linkage, or perhaps both depending on circumstances? 
